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Abstract
It is imperative to address the issue of secure routing in mobile ad-hoc networks 
(MANETs) where the nodes seek for cooperative and trusted behaviour from the peer 
nodes in the absence of well-established infrastructure and centralized authority. Due 
to the inherent absence of security considerations in the traditional ad-hoc routing pro-
tocols, providing security and reliability in the routing of data packets is a major chal-
lenge. This work addresses this issue by proposing a composite trust metric based on 
the concept of social trust and quality-of-service (QoS) trust. Extended from the ad-hoc 
on-demand distance vector (AODV) routing protocol, we propose an enhanced trust-
based model integrated with an attack-pattern discovery mechanism, which attempts to 
mitigate the adversaries craving to carry out distinct types of packet-forwarding misbe-
haviours. We present the detailed mode of operations of three distinct adversary mod-
els against which the proposed scheme is evaluated. Simulation results under different 
network conditions depict that the combination of social and QoS trust components pro-
vides significant improvement in packet delivery ratio, routing overhead, and energy 
consumption compared to an existing trust-based scheme.
Keywords: packet-forwarding misbehaviour, secure routing, composite trust model, 
attack pattern discovery, mobile ad-hoc networks
1. Introduction
A mobile ad-hoc network (MANET) is an autonomous system of wireless mobile nodes that 
dynamically form a network in order to exchange information in the absence of centralized 
authority and fixed infrastructure. Mobile nodes communicate with each other in a multi-
hop way to carry out data transmission due to limited communication range and resource 
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constraints of the nodes. In the absence of router, each node operates as a host as well as a 
wireless router to forward packets for other nodes that may be outside its communication 
range [1]. The network functions well if all nodes operate in an altruistic manner. Due to the 
openness in network topology, distributed nature and lack of central authority, MANETs are 
particularly vulnerable to different types of routing attacks launched by internal nodes [2]. As 
a result, routing in such dynamic networks faces inherent challenges as compared to the tra-
ditional wireless networks. The traditional routing protocols proposed for ad-hoc networks 
are inefficient in dealing with different routing attacks.
The security schemes based on traditional cryptographic systems are typically used to resist 
external attacks. However, they prove to be inefficient in resisting the attacks launched by 
internal malevolent nodes. Such malicious nodes may seriously influence the security of the 
network by performing distinct types of packet-forwarding misbehaviours. In such a hostile 
environment, introducing the concept of ‘trust’ would provide prediction about the behav-
iour of neighbour nodes [2]. The notion of trust would prove to be useful for dynamic envi-
ronments where the nodes need to depend on each other to achieve their goals [3]. Recently, 
trust management schemes have been considered as a viable security solution to improve the 
routing decisions in MANETs by detecting and isolating distrusted nodes [4].
In our previous work [5], we devised a trusted routing scheme with pattern discovery (TRS-PD) 
that integrates a trust model (based on QoS trust components) with an attack-pattern discov-
ery mechanism in order to detect the malicious nodes earlier than a solitary trust model. 
TRS-PD estimates the distrust degree of neighbour nodes using direct trust computation. On 
the top of this, the attack-pattern discovery mechanism is introduced, which predicts suspi-
cious activities of the neighbour nodes by promiscuously monitoring and recording specific 
fields of the control packets which are transmitted by the neighbour nodes. This gives an idea 
about the neighbour nodes, which might be following certain attack patterns. In addition, the 
scheme carries out indirect computation using recommendations by the trusted neighbours 
in order to enhance the trust establishment process. In this chapter, we propose enhanced 
TRS-PD (ETRS-PD), which uses a composite trust model that combines social trust compo-
nent along with QoS trust components. ETRS-PD attempts to improve the packet delivery 
ratio against the adversary models discussed in Ref. [5] by enhancing the routing process. The 
performance of ETRS-PD is compared with TRS-PD against these adversary models under 
different network conditions.
The main technical contributions of this work are as follows: (1) An enhanced trust model is 
proposed for AODV protocol to evaluate neighbours’ distrust value using composite trust 
metric. (2) Simulations carried out to compare the performance of ETRS-PD with TRS-PD 
prove that the performance of MANETs employing ETRS-PD is superior to that of MANETs 
employing TRS-PD against distinct types of adversaries.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses relevant related work. 
In Section 3, the proposed trust model is discussed. The enhanced trust-based on-demand 
routing scheme incorporated into AODV protocol is discussed in Section 4. Section 5 pres-
ents operations performed by various adversary models. The simulation results depicting the 
performance of ETRS-PD are presented in Section 6. Finally, Section 7 concludes the chapter.
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2. Related work
A substantial amount of research work has been carried out in the last few years to address 
the security requirements of routing protocols by means of trust management.
A trust-based source routing (TSR) scheme devised by Xia et al. [6] attempts to discover a 
shortest secure route for data transmission in MANETs. Neighbour nodes are evaluated based 
on the historical trust values using correct packet-forwarding ratios. In addition, fuzzy logic 
is used to estimate a node’s current trust based on its capability and historical trust value. This 
estimated value is used to predict the misbehaving nodes in the neighbourhood. A trusted 
route is selected for data transmission by avoiding such untrustworthy nodes. Experimental 
results show the effectiveness of TSR against blackhole, grayhole and modification attacks. 
However, the scheme incurs high computational overhead in calculation of route trust after 
arrival of every data packet at the destination. Furthermore, the scheme requires buffering of 
the packets in a circular queue, which incurs significant overhead in searching the match for 
the packets in the buffer. Gharehkoolchian et al. [7] proposed a novel trust model, which uses 
different trust levels (TL) for nodes and imposes the limitations based on the trust level in order 
to mitigate the malicious nodes. When a node enters the network, it is assigned TL = 1. It gains 
higher reputation if it acts normally by forwarding packets and thereby, it is assigned TL = 2. 
In case of malicious behaviour, it is assigned TL = 0. If the malicious behaviour of the node is 
observed for three times, it is assigned TL = −1 and the node is permanently blocked. During 
the route discovery process, when a node receives a route reply from its neighbour node, it 
verifies its TL value. If the node is a non-malicious node (TL = 2), the route reply is forwarded. 
Otherwise, a test route request is sent to the suspicious node (TL = 1) after the received route 
reply. If an abnormal reply is received from the suspicious node in response to the test route 
request, the route reply is discarded after assigning TL = 0 to the node and the node is blocked 
for a specific time. Thus, the scheme attempts to isolate the malicious nodes during route 
discovery process. However, it does not have any reactive mechanism to cope up with sudden 
drops in packets during data transmission phase; instead, it just detects the adversary but 
attempts to isolate it during the next route discovery process. Airehrour et al. [8] proposed 
GradeTrust protocol to isolate blackhole adversaries by selecting a secure path, in addition to 
elimination of excessive routing computations and minimization of communication over-
head. It classifies the nodes into three sets in order of the trust levels: Trusted Friends, Friends 
and Possible Friends. Trust level is assigned by monitoring neighbours’ request packet-for-
warding ratio. A source node selects the next hop from its Trusted Friends, and the process 
continues until the packet reaches the destination. In the case of unavailability of a Trusted 
Friend, a Friend is selected. A compromised node is dissociated swiftly from other trusted 
nodes, and it is pushed down to the lower trust level. However, the scheme does not consider 
the forwarding ratio of data packets in calculation of the trust level, which makes it suscepti-
ble to packet dropping adversaries during data transmission phase. In addition, simulation 
results showing comparison of the proposed protocol with the traditional protocols are not 
promising. Patel et al. [9] proposed a trust model for AODV-based MANETs, which attempts 
to increase network lifetime by uniform consumption of energy. A trust value is computed 
based on dropping ratios and delays of control and data packets as well as residual node 
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energy. The scheme attempts to discover a trusted route during the route reply propagation 
towards the source node on the reverse path. All the intermediate nodes receiving the route 
reply packet update the path trust value in the packet using the available trust values of 
neighbours. If a node receives multiple route reply packets, it compares the trust of the newly 
received path with that of the current path and stores the path with the maximum trust value. 
However, the scheme does not have any reactive mechanism to fight against packet-dropping 
adversaries during data transmission phase. After identifying an adversary, it waits for the 
next route discovery process to isolate it. Chiejina et al. [10] proposed a solution to evaluate 
the trust of a node in the network, which ensures that nodes expending their energy in for-
warding data and control packets for other nodes are allowed to carry on their activities while 
the malevolent nodes are isolated from the network. Trust values are computed by direct 
observations, which are aggregated at different time intervals to provide a historical reputa-
tion of the node. The total reputation value of a node is mapped with a grading criterion to 
decide the status of a node. Nodes with lower reputation value than the set threshold value 
are blacklisted and denied the network resources. Routes containing blacklisted nodes are 
discarded, and alternative routes are discovered. The solution attempts to mitigate selfish and 
deceitful nodes from the network with scarce resources. However, whenever the source sends 
a packet towards the destination, the solution generates additional overhead as path adminis-
trator has to check that the packet has not been sent via a path containing a blacklisted node. 
Mylsamy et al. [11] proposed a preference-based protocol for trust and head selection (2PTH), which 
takes four parameters to calculate a trust value: packet delivery ratio, packet misrouting ratio, 
packet alteration ratio, and packet injection ratio. Depending on the affected security param-
eters, weighing coefficients’ values are determined. Trust values are classified into three dif-
ferent categories: high, medium and low. If trust value of a node goes below its relative 
threshold, it is not allowed to participate as a cluster member. A cluster-based routing mecha-
nism is used which discovers a stable cluster head based on external factors such mobility, 
connectivity and distance as well as internal factors such as residual battery power, process-
ing power and memory. When a cluster head of the cluster of the destination node receives a 
route request packet during the route discovery process, it verifies the trustworthiness of the 
node in order to establish a secure route. Simulation results show promising performance of 
the protocol as compared to some existing protocols. However, the protocol does not have 
any reactive mechanism for identifying packet-dropping adversaries during data transmis-
sion phase. Moreover, weight assignment and cluster head election consume a significant amount 
of computational resources. Indirani et al. [12] presented a swarm-based distributed intrusion 
detection system (SDIDS) with the objective to remove the complexity in the design of an IDS 
caused by the inherent MANET characteristics. Active nodes in a route are selected by ant 
colony optimization (ACO) technique based on a node’s packet-forwarding activities, residual 
bandwidth, residual energy and connectivity. A forward ant reaches to every node in order to 
compute and update the pheromone value using the aforementioned parameters. When it 
reaches the destination, the information collected by the forward ant about all the hops is 
transferred to the backward ant. The backward ant then traverses on the reverse path and 
reaches to the source in order to deliver the status of all nodes. A routing decision is then 
made by selecting the optimal route to the destination. However, the scheme incurs high 
computational overhead in calculation of route trust. In addition, establishment of a trusted 
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route should not be the sole responsibility of the source node. Xia et al. [13] proposed a light-
weight trust-enhanced routing protocol (TeAOMDV), which attempts to provide an optimal two-
way trusted route without containing the malicious entities. Its trust framework uses passive 
and local monitoring information to evaluate the trust values of neighbours. It considers 
activity, stability and historical trust record of a node in evaluation of a node trust. Moreover, 
the trust value is modified by collecting the recommendations from the trusted neighbours. It 
uses hop count, forward path trust and reverse path trust as the metrics to compose a three-
dimensional evaluation vector for taking routing decisions. The authors extend their work by 
proposing an improved SCGM(1,1)-Markov chain prediction method based on the system cloud 
grey model and Markov stochastic chain theory to forecast trust level of a node for future routing 
decisions. However, it holds similar drawbacks as the scheme proposed in [12] due to the 
consideration of route trust. Azer et al. [14] proposed a new reputation system for ad hoc net-
works, called misbehaviour detection and control (MDAC), which encourages the nodes to act in 
a trustworthy manner. It obtains first hand and second hand information about neighbouring 
nodes. Trust is evaluated based on number of incoming packets and total consumed time to 
deliver packets. The MDAC modeller module combines all collected information about a node 
into a meaningful reputation value. Based on the reputation values, nodes in the network are 
guided to take necessary actions such as trust/don’t trust, cooperate/don’t cooperate and for-
ward/don’t forward. A node is considered eligible for service only after verifying its reputa-
tion value. The mechanism shows better performance compared to an existing scheme in 
terms of throughput and delay. However, the mechanism does not consider control packets 
in the calculation of the reputation value which delays the detection of sequence number 
attacks. In addition, it adds significant computational overhead in making reputation deci-
sions about neighbouring nodes. Rajkumar et al. [15] proposed a trust-based light-weight 
authentication routing protocol which adopts multipath route discovery technique to miti-
gate adversaries. A route is rated based on packet success rate after route reply is forwarded 
to the source node. An optimal path for data transmission is chosen based on its rating, and 
the next optimal path is stored as an alternative arrangement. The protocol calculates a trust 
value using EigenTrust algorithm, which is based on direct and indirect observations of neigh-
bour nodes. A resolver is engaged for computing a global trust value of the node, which also 
executes trust noise cancellation mechanism. If the trust value of a node goes below the 
threshold value, it is authenticated using the Shamir’s secret sharing technique. If a node is 
found to be malicious, all routes going through the node are discarded and the alternate opti-
mal path is selected. However, cryptographic approaches add considerable amount of com-
munication and memory overhead along with key distribution issues. In addition, the scheme 
involves high computational overhead in the estimation of packet success rate and calculation 
of the global trust value.
3. Trust model
As a part of the literature survey, we discover that a composite trust metric based on social and 
QoS trust components may successfully perform tasks to meet both performance and trust 
requirements [16, 17]. We have noticed some work in the literature moving in this direction. 
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Cho et al. [17] considered honesty and intimacy, while Kohlas et al. [18] considered honesty, 
competency, reliability and maliciousness as social trust components to define trust relation-
ships. In addition, we observe that energy consumption is an important QoS trust component 
for improving the network performance [17, 19]. Taking these notes into consideration, we 
devise an enhanced trust-based scheme, ETRS-PD.
ETRS-PD considers ditch ratio as a social trust component in estimation of distrust degree of 
the neighbours. This social trust component is utilized to know the magnitude of misbehav-
iour carried out by a node while residing in monitoring node’s neighbourhood. In addition, 
energy consumption is considered as an additional QoS component along with packet drop ratio. 
Thus, a composite trust metric is constructed by including social trust along with QoS trust. 
Furthermore, the routing process of TRS-PD is modified to enhance the routing decisions. As 
aforementioned, ETRS-PD attempts to improve the packet delivery ratio against the adver-
sary models discussed in our previous work [5].
In our trust model, we compute historical trust on a constant basis after a specific time inter-
val called trust update interval. Overall, our trust model performs trust derivation and trust 
computation along with discovery of attack patterns. We modify the trust model of TRS-PD 
to perform trust derivation and trust computation in a different way.
3.1. Basic assumptions
Our trust-based scheme makes the following assumptions: (i) all the mobile nodes have iden-
tical physical characteristics; (ii) the wireless links in the network are bidirectional; (iii) all 
the nodes operate in promiscuous mode in order to observe the neighbour nodes and (iv) 
the source and the destination are benevolent nodes. The above assumptions are fulfilled by 
wireless MAC layer protocols.
3.2. Trust derivation
Our proposed trust model uses direct observations to derive distrust values of neighbour 
nodes by observing packet dropping ratios, energy consumption and ditch ratio of neigh-
bour nodes. In addition to this, each node employs an attack pattern discovery mechanism, 
which detects malicious patterns generated by neighbour nodes in the transmitted control 
packets. We also consider recommendations of trusted neighbours for improving the routing 
decisions.
3.3. Trust computation
In a routing process, neighbour node’s distrust is evaluated by the sender by observing activi-
ties carried out by that neighbour. To be specific, a node n
i
 will increase the distrust score of 
its neighbour n
j
 if the n
j
 does not forward the packet sent by n
i
 [5].
Definition 1. Control dropping ratio (CDR): It is the ratio of the number of control packets 
dropped to the number of control packets which are supposed to be forwarded. At time t, 
CDR(t) is computed as follows:
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  CDR (t)  =   NC d (t)  ______
 NC 
a
 (t) 
(1)
where NCd(t) signifies the cumulative count of dropped control packets, and NCa(t) repre-
sents the total number of sent control packets from time 0 to t.
Definition 2. Data dropping ratio (CDR): It is the ratio of the number of data packets dropped 
to the number of data packets, which are supposed to be forwarded. At time t, CDR(t) is com-
puted as follows:
  DDR (t)  =   ND d (t)  ______
 ND 
a
 (t) 
(2)
where NDd(t) signifies the cumulative count of dropped control packets, and NDa(t) repre-
sents the total number of sent control packets from time 0 to t.
Definition 3. Energy consumption (EC): It is the ratio of the energy consumed by a node to the 
initial energy of that node. When a node possesses limited residual energy, it may not hold 
the capabilities to forward the packets of other nodes. At time t, EC(t) is computed as follows:
  EC (t)  =  EI - ER (t)  _______
EI
 (3)
where EI signifies the initial energy, and ER(t) signifies the residual energy of the node at 
time t.
Definition 4. Ditch ratio (DTR): It is the ratio of the number of times a neighbour node is found 
to be distrusted while receiving its HELLO packets to the total number of HELLO packets 
received from that node. At time t, DTR(t) is computed as follows:
  DTR (t)  =   NH d (t)  ______
 NH 
a
 (t) 
(4)
where NHd(t) signifies the number of times a distrusted neighbor node has ditched the moni-
toring node while sending HELLO packets, and NHa(t) signifies the total number of HELLO 
packets received from that neighbour node.
The obtained distrust value of a node nj by a monitoring node ni is the measure of packet 
dropping activities, energy drain rate and magnitude of misbehaviour. The distrust value of 
node nj evaluated by node ni, denoted as DTVij, is calculated by the following formula:
  DTV 
ij
 (t)  = w1 ×  CDR 
ij
 (t) + w2 ×  DDR 
ij
 (t) + w3 ×  EC 
ij
 (t) + w4 ×  DTR 
ij
 (t) (5)
where w1, w2, w3 and w4 (w1, w2, w3, w4 ≥ 0 and w1 + w2 + w3 + w4 = 1) are the weights 
assigned to CDR, DDR, EC and DTR, respectively.
In our trust model, distrust values are restricted in the range from 0 to 1 (i.e., 0 ≤ DTVij ≤ 1). 
The distrust value 0 indicates complete trust, whereas the distrust value 1 signifies complete 
distrust. We set the initial value of distrust to 0 as we assume all the nodes to be benevolent 
initially. Meanwhile, the distrust value constantly varies with the time as per the behaviour of 
neighbour nodes. We use a distrust threshold η to differentiate the malicious nodes from benign 
nodes.
As discussed in Ref. [5], we incorporate an attack pattern discovery mechanism on the top of 
the trust model, which employs the model of method of common differences (MCD). Thus, the 
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pattern discovery mechanism attempts to identify the adversaries following attack patterns 
prior to conducting misbehaviours; on the other hand, the trust model detects other packet-
dropping adversaries during the trust update procedure.
4. Enhanced trust-based on-demand routing
While any reactive routing protocol can be extended to incorporate ETRS-PD, we extend ad-
hoc on-demand distance vector (AODV) protocol for this purpose. In addition to the modi-
fications described in [5], we further modify the functionality of AODV in order to improve 
the routing decisions. The neighbour table is modified by appending the following fields: 
(i) Energy consumption, (ii) Ditch count: The number of times a neighbour node is found to be 
distrusted while receiving its HELLO packets, (iii) HELLO count: The total number of HELLO 
packets received from a neighbour node and (iv) Ditch ratio. The distrust value is calculated as 
per the formula (5). We modify the HELLO packets to include an additional field: (i) Energy 
consumed: Energy consumed by the node, which is provided as information to the neighbour 
nodes (calculated as per the formula (3)).
4.1. Routing strategy
We further modify the routing strategy described in Ref. [5]. The modified routing strategy 
(by modifying Step 4, Step 8 and Step 9) is described herewith:
Step 1: Before starting data transmission, the source node ns looks up in its local routing table 
for the destination node n
d
.
Step 2: If entry exists, it starts sending data through the trusted next hop to n
d
. Go to Step 8.
Step 3: If no such route exists, n
s
 initiates a route discovery process by flooding route request 
(RREQ) packets to discover a route to n
d
.
Step 4: When an intermediate node n
k
 receives a route reply (RREP) from its neighbour node 
n
j
, it accepts the reply only if n
j
 is not a distrusted node (n
k
 finds absence of attack patterns for 
n
j
 with distrust value less than or equal to η) and recommended as a trusted node.
Step 5: If multiple route replies are received after the route discovery process, a route entry for 
the route with the highest destination sequence number and trusted next hop is created for nd 
and inserted into the routing table of ns.
Step 6: If no such route is discovered, go to Step 3.
Step 7: Node n
s
 starts data transmission to nd.
Step 8: If an intermediate node n
k
 finds a next hop n
m
 distrusted (by direct observation or by rec-
ommendation) in its routing table for a destination n
p
 during the trust update procedure, the 
entry is discarded. A local route discovery process is initiated by n
k
 to discover an alternate 
route to n
p
.
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Step 9: Even though an intermediate node nk finds a distrusted neighbor n
m
 attempting to 
regain its trust by recuperating the distrust value less than or equal to η, it is still considered as 
a distrusted node (i.e. it is not reconsidered as a trusted node).
4.2. Routing procedures
The procedures for sending RREQ, receiving RREQ and sending RREP remain unmodified as 
presented in Figures 1–3, respectively (as described in Ref. [5]).
Figure 1. SendRREQ procedure [5].
Figure 2. RecvRREQ procedure [5].
Figure 3. SendRREP procedure [5].
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The modifications carried out in the receiving RREP procedure are highlighted in Figure 4.
The procedure for route maintenance remains unmodified as presented in Figure 5 (as 
described in Ref. [5]).
4.3. Trust update and trust recommendation procedures
The modifications carried out in the trust update and trust recommendation procedures are 
highlighted in Figures 6 and 7, respectively.
Figure 4. RecvRREP procedure.
Figure 5. Route maintenance procedure [5].
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Figure 6. Update trust procedure.
Figure 7. Recommend trust procedure.
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5. Adversary models
It is obvious that the success of any security mechanism largely depends on the operations 
performed by the adversaries. In our work, we evaluate the performance of ETRS-PD against 
three adversary models described in Ref. [5].
5.1. Intelligent adversary model
The operations performed by intelligent adversary (denoted as Attack1) are presented in Figure 8 
[5, 20]. The adversary follows a pattern in inserting the value of hop count (Hop_Count = 2) 
while sending RREP packet.
5.2. Slow poison adversary model
The operations performed by slow poison adversary (denoted as Attack2) are presented in 
Figure 9 [5]. The adversary follows a pattern in inserting the value of destination sequence 
number (RREQ_Dest_Seqno + 1) while sending RREP packet.
Figure 8. Operations performed by a node launching Attack1 [5, 20].
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5.3. Capricious adversary model
The operations performed by capricious adversary (denoted as Attack3) are presented in 
Figure 10 [5]. This adversary does not generate any attack pattern while sending RREP packet.
Figure 9. Operations performed by a node launching Attack2 [5].
Figure 10. Operations performed by a node launching Attack3 [5].
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6. Simulation results and analysis
NS-2 (ver. 2.34) simulator is used to evaluate the performance efficiency of ETRS-PD against the 
three adversary models, namely Attack1, Attack2 and Attack3. To prove our claim that ETRS-PD 
provides enhanced routing process than our previous proposal, TRS-PD [5], the performance of 
ETRS-PD is compared with TRS-PD against all three adversary models. We employ IEEE 802.11 
MAC to carry out simulations in an area of 1000 × 1000 m. The benign nodes were randomly 
distributed over the network, which employs either AODV, ETRS-PD or TRS-PD protocol. 
Randomly positioned malicious nodes selectively perform packet forwarding misbehaviours by 
employing either of the three adversary models, namely Attack1, Attack2 and Attack3. It is con-
sidered that the wireless network interface consumes 1.65, 1.4, 1.15 and 0.045 W for the Transmit, 
Receive and Idle modes and the Sleep state, respectively [21]. We take 800 μs as the transition time 
from the Sleep state to Awake state and during this transition period, a mobile node will con-
sume 2.3 W power. All the experimental data are obtained after performing 10 different simula-
tions and taking their average values. The major simulation parameters are shown in Table 1.
 
Parameter Value
Coverage area 1000 × 1000 m
MAC layer protocol IEEE 802.11
Communication range of each node 250 m
Channel bandwidth 2 Mbps
Traffic type CBR-UDP
Packet size 512 bytes
Mobility model Random way point
Simulation duration 240 s
Number of nodes 50
Maximum mobility (varying) 4–20 m/s
Pause time 5 s
Number of connections 15
Percentage of malicious nodes (varying) 0–40%
Routing protocols AODV, Attack1, Attack2, Attack3, TRS-PD, ETRS-PD
Initial energy 1000 J
Transmit power 1.65 W
Receive power 1.4 W
Idle power 1.15 W
Sleep power 0.045 W
Transition power 2.3 W
Transition time 800 μs
Table 1. Simulation parameters.
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In order to evaluate the performance of ETRS-PD, the following performance metrics are 
used: packet delivery ratio (PDR), normalized routing overhead (NRO) and average energy consump-
tion (AEC). The following network parameters are varied: (1) maximum speeds of nodes and (2) 
percentage of adversaries.
The performance of AODV and TRS-PD in terms of PDR and NRO is already evaluated in Ref. 
[5], while their performance in terms of AEC is evaluated in Ref. [21].
6.1. Test 1: varying node mobility
In this test, the performance of the protocols is evaluated against Attack1, Attack2 and Attack3 
by varying mobility of nodes from 4 to 20 m/s and keeping other parameters fixed. The per-
centage of malicious nodes is kept fixed to 20% for all three types of adversaries.
As shown in Figure 11, the PDR of AODV under Attack1 declines from nearly 46 to 39% as the 
mobility increases from 4 to 20 m/s. The increase in packet loss at higher mobility is due to the 
increased number of link breakages at higher node speeds. Meanwhile, PDR of AODV under 
Attack2 and Attack3 declines from nearly 68 to 60% and 74 to 64%, respectively, as shown in 
Figures 12 and 13, respectively. When TRS-PD is employed, the PDR declines from nearly 73 
to 57%, 79 to 69% and 80 to 69% under Attack1, Attack2 and Attack3, respectively. This consid-
erable rise in PDR is due to the integration of the attack-pattern discovery mechanism with the 
trust model. Meanwhile, when ETRS-PD is employed, it provides improvement in PDR over 
TRS-PD by an average of 6.21 under Attack1, 2.82 under Attack2 and 4.03 under Attack3. The 
reasons behind improved results are as follows: (i) Construction of a composite trust metric 
using social trust and QoS trust. (ii) Enhanced routing decisions due to the modifications car-
ried out in receive RREP, trust update and trust recommendation procedures.
Figure 11. PDR under Attack1.
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As shown in Figures 14–16, as the node speed increases, the NRO of AODV increases from 
nearly 5.7 to 10.4, 1.8 to 4.1 and 2.8 to 5.1 under Attack1, Attack2 and Attack3, respectively. 
Figure 12. PDR under Attack2.
Figure 13. PDR under Attack3.
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Meanwhile, the TRS-PD provides improved performance over AODV by providing NRO 
from nearly 4.5 to 8.5 and 2.8 to 5.1 under Attack1 and Attack3, respectively. On the other 
hand, due to the Fibonacci dropping behaviour of Attack2 during the data transmission phase, 
the number of route hand-off mechanisms increases for TRS-PD as time goes on. As a 
result,  resultant NRO is higher than that of AODV, which varies between nearly 3.2 and 
5.5. Meanwhile, ETRS-PD provides improvement in NRO over TRS-PD by an average of 
1.43 under Attack1, 0.30 under Attack2 and 0.36 under Attack3. The reason behind this is, 
ETRS-PD leads to less number of route hand-off mechanisms than TRS-PD due to the inclu-
sion of two more components in the overall trust composition as well as enhanced routing 
process.
In order to ensure the improvement in energy consumption, we compare the perfor-
mance of ETRS-PD with TRS-PD. As depicted by the graph in Figure 17, the AEC under 
Attack1 varies between 313.56 and 314.13 J when employing TRS-PD. Meanwhile, ETRS-PD 
improves the AEC of TRS-PD by an average of 1.6 J. As depicted by the graph in Figure 18, 
the AEC under Attack2 varies in the range of 312.82–314.4 J when employing TRS-PD. 
Meanwhile, ETRS-PD improves the AEC of TRS-PD by an average of 0.57 J. As depicted 
by the graph in Figure 19, the AEC under Attack3 varies between 312.79 and 313.41 J when 
employing TRS-PD. Meanwhile, ETRS-PD improves the AEC of TRS-PD by an average of 
0.57 J.
Figure 14. NRO under Attack1.
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Figure 16. NRO under Attack3.
Figure 15. NRO under Attack2.
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Figure 17. AEC under Attack1.
Figure 18. AEC under Attack2.
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6.2. Test 2: varying percentage of malicious nodes
In this test, the performance of the protocols is evaluated against Attack1, Attack2 and Attack3 
by varying percentage of malicious nodes from 0 to 40% and keeping other parameters fixed. 
The mobility parameter is kept fixed to 20 m/s for all three types of adversaries.
As shown in Figures 20–22, due to the increased intensity of packet dropping activities with 
the percentage increase in malicious nodes, the PDR of AODV declines from nearly 79 to 32%, 
79 to 54% and 79 to 56% under Attack1, Attack2 and Attack3, respectively. On the other hand, 
TRS-PD proves provides improvement in PDR of nearly 12 to 18%, 8 to 9% and 4.5 to 7% in the 
presence of malicious nodes launching Attack1, Attack2 and Attack3, respectively. Meanwhile, 
in the presence of adversaries, ETRS-PD provides improvement in PDR over TRS-PD by an 
average of 7.67 under Attack1, 2.14 under Attack2 and 4.29 under Attack3.
The NRO of AODV varies in the range of nearly 4.8–12.1, 3.9–4.8 and 4.7–5.4 under Attack1, 
Attack2 and Attack3, respectively, as shown in Figures 23–25. On the other hand, TRS-PD 
improves NRO by maximum of 2.2 and 0.5 under Attack1 and Attack3 respectively over 
AODV. Meanwhile, TRS-PD increases NRO from nearly 0.7 to 2.0 under Attack2 as compared 
to AODV. On the other hand, in the presence of adversaries, ETRS-PD provides improvement 
in NRO over TRS-PD by an average of 2.22 under Attack1, 0.25 under Attack2 and 0.46 under 
Attack3 due to the aforementioned reasons.
As shown in Figures 26–28, when employing TRS-PD, the AEC of the network without the 
presence of adversaries is 313.84 J while that is 312.35 J when employing ETRS-PD. As shown 
in Figure 26, the AEC for the MANET employing TRS-PD under Attack1  varies between 314.08 
Figure 19. AEC under Attack3.
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Figure 20. PDR under Attack1.
Figure 21. PDR under Attack2.
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Figure 23. NRO under Attack1.
Figure 22. PDR under Attack3.
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Figure 24. NRO under Attack2.
Figure 25. NRO under Attack3.
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Figure 26. AEC under Attack1.
Figure 27. AEC under Attack2.
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and 314.25 J. Meanwhile, ETRS-PD improves the AEC of TRS-PD by an average of 1.83 J in the 
presence of adversaries. As shown in Figure 27, the AEC of the MANET employing TRS-PD 
under Attack2 decreases from 314.08 to 313.2 J. Meanwhile, ETRS-PD improves the AEC of 
TRS-PD by an average of 0.34 J in the presence of adversaries. As shown in Figure 28, the AEC of 
the MANET employing TRS-PD under Attack3 varies between 312.68 and 313.41 J. Meanwhile, 
ETRS-PD improves the AEC of TRS-PD by an average of 0.67 J in the presence of adversaries.
7. Conclusions
As a part of the literature survey, we observe that integration of QoS trust and social trust in 
the composition of a trust metric would improve the performance of a trust-based scheme. 
Considering these notes, we modify our previous trust-based scheme, TRS-PD, such that it com-
bines both the types of trust components. In addition, we suggest modifications in the route 
discovery, trust update and trust recommendation procedures of TRS-PD. The proposed trust-
based approach, ETRS-PD, improves the routing decisions due to the suggested modifications. 
The performance comparison of ETRS-PD with TRS-PD under three distinct adversary mod-
els shows that ETRS-PD achieves remarkable improvement in packet delivery ratio due to the 
enhanced routing process and inclusion of two new trust components. Moreover, ETRS-PD 
reduces the generation of number of control packets due to the reduced number of route hand-
off mechanisms. As a result, ETRS-PD provides improved normalized routing overhead as well 
as energy consumption as compared to TRS-PD under different network scenarios.
Figure 28. AEC under Attack3.
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